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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONALD WEBB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Supreme Court No. 870360

vs
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
corporation, WILLIAM REAGAN,
individually, and DOUGLAS T.
HALL, individually,
Defendants-Respondents,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
This is an action arising out of plaintiff's demand to
examine the books and records of R.O.A. General, Inc. (hereinafter
"R.O.A.") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47 (1953).

This appeal

is taken from the August 28, 1987, Order of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya
presiding, denying plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and granting defendant-respondents', R.O.A. and William
Reagan, Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.

The Court's

Order of August 28, 1987 has been certified as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This

Court has appellate jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the exercise of defendant R.O.A.fs option to

purchase plaintiff's stock terminate plaintiff's status as a
"stockholder" within the purview of Utah Code Ann, §16-10-47 (1953)?
2.

Did the plaintiff contract away his statutory right to

inspect R.O.A.'s books and records under the stock purchase
agreement?
3.

Did plaintiff demand to inspect R.O.A.'s books and

records at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose as required
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(d) (1953)?
4.

Even if the trial court committed error, is plaintiff

entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on his claims
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47 (1953)?
5.

Does Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) provide for

the recovery of multiple statutory penalties under the facts of the
instant case?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) (1953), §16-10-47(b) and (c)
(1953); and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure determine
the outcome of this appeal.

Due to the length of these provisions,

the text of each is set forth in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an action by plaintiff to compel
defendants R.O.A. and Reagan to produce the corporate books and
records of R.O.A. for inspection pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§16-10-47(b) (1953).

Plaintiff also seeks to recover the statutory
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penalties imposed under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) for
defendants1 alleged multiple wrongful refusals to allow such
examinations.
Plaintiff and his wife, Bessie Webb, formerly owned stock
in R.O.A. as joint tenants.

(R. at 2, 80, 84, 89, 90, 130, 517)

On July 7, 1981, plaintiff and Bessie Webb (hereinafter the
"Webbs"), and William Reagan (hereinafter "Reagan"), executed a
written agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement"), forming R.O.A., a
Utah corporation.

(R. at 62-78)

Pursuant to the Agreement, Reagan

obtained 80% of the stock of R.O.A. and the Webbs acquired the
balance of the stock.

(R. at 34, 203, 274)

Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Agreement, R.O.A. had the
right to purchase all of the Webbs' stock.

(R. at 71-72)

In order

to exercise such right, R.O.A. was only required to provide notice
of the purchase within 6 months after August 1, 1986.

(R. at 71-72)

Pursuant to the Agreement, the purchase price of the Webbs' stock
was to be set and determined by an independent appraisal.
62-78)

(R. at

The terms of payment for the Webbs' stock were also

determined in the Agreement.

(R. at 71-74)

Following notice of

R.O.A.'s election to purchase their stock, the Webbs were
contractually required to obtain an initial independent appraisal
of the stock's value.

(R. at 72)

Plaintiff served as a director of R.O.A. beginning on
August 1, 1981.

(R. at 35, 80)

During the period of his

employment as a director of R.O.A. and for so long as the Webbs
were stockholders, plaintiff maintained an office at R.O.A.'s
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corporate headquarters and had access to the books and records of
R.O.A.

Plaintiff, in fact, periodically reviewed R.O.A.fs books

and records.

(R. at 158, 178-81, 287)

On or about March 5, 1985, the Webbs, by and through their
accountant, Duane E. Karren, made demand upon R.O.A. to formally
inspect its corporate books and records.

(R. at 190-94)

Pursuant

to the Webbs1 request, R.O.A. made its books and records available
for inspection.
and records.

Mr. Karren subsequently inspected R.O.A.!s books

(R. at 191)

By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice to
the Webbs of its exercise of its purchase option.

(R. at 43, 78A,

207, 280, 484, 508)
On April 20, 1987, plaintiff informed R.O.A. and Reagan
that he intended to exercise his statutory right to inspect the
books and records of R.O.A.

(R. at 53, 485)

demand was made solely by plaintiff.

The April 20, 1987

The demand did not include a

similar request from Bessie Webb, the joint owner of the Webbs'
share.

The demand did not state the purpose of the proposed

examination.

(R. at 53)

Plaintiff's April 20 demand was received at R.O.A.
headquarters while Reagan was out of the country.

R.O.A. informed

plaintiff that Reagan would be out of the country until May 18,
1987.

R.O.A. requested that plaintiff renew his demand once Reagan

returned.

(R. at 54, 485) R.O.A. also informed plaintiff that

recent personnel changes in R.O.A.'s accounting department would
make such an inspection extremely difficult for R.O.A. to respond
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to immediately.

R.O.A. also indicated that plaintiff would need to

clarify his demand in order to facilitate production of the desired
records.

(R. at 54)
Plaintiff's accountant, Mr. Karren, on or about May 18,

1987, more specifically set out the records he sought to inspect.
The May 18 letter indicated that the desired examination was to be
substantially similar to Mr. Karren!s prior examination of R.O.A.fs
records.

(R. at 55-56)

The letter did not set a date for

examination of the records.
Much of the information requested in the May 18 letter
required R.O.A. to expend considerable time and effort to comply
with the request.

Plaintiff's May 18 request required defendant to

do far more than simply open its books for inspection.

Plaintiff

specifically demanded that R.O.A. assemble various summaries and
explanations of certain business transactions.

(R. at 55-56)

On May 20, 1987, plaintiff made demand upon R.O.A. through
a new agent, Attorney Victoria E. Brieant.

The May 20 demand

stated that Attorney Brieant and others would be present at 10:00
a.m. on May 27, 1987, at the offices of R.O.A. to examine the
corporate records.

(R. at 57, 93)

Plaintiff made no effort to

arrange a mutually convenient time to conduct the investigation.
Attorney Brieant's May 20 demand also indicated that she
intended to use "our accountants, Peat, Marwick & Mitchell . . . ."
Ms. Brieantfs demand also alluded to the need for an appraisal.
The demand did not specify, however, whether the requested
examination would be used in the appraisal of the Webbs' stock as
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required under the Agreement.

(R. at 57)

Defendants R.O.A. and Reagan responded to plaintiff's
demand by requesting several concessions:

First, that R.O.A. be

given sufficient time to prepare for the examination; second, that
the examination be conducted in accordance with the Agreement's
appraisal process; third, that the confidentiality of R.O.A-fs
trade secrets and financial information be maintained, and lastly,
that the inspection be done in an orderly fashion so as to minimize
disruption of R.O.A.'s ongoing business.

(R. at 58, 94)

In May, 1987, Richard Brooks, a key employee in R.O.A.'s
accounting department, terminated his employment.

Mr. Brooks'

absence left R.O.A. shorthanded, thereby making it extremely
difficult for R.O.A. to promptly prepare the requested summaries
and reports.

(R. at 54, 178-81, 287)

On May 26, 1987, a letter was hand-delivered to
plaintiff's counsel from defendants' counsel, William H. Adams.
Mr. Adams explained that R.O.A.fs records would be made available
for examination by plaintiff or his agents in accordance with the
appraisal rights accorded plaintiff under the Agreement.

Adams

indicated that it would be unreasonable to expect R.O.A. to assume
the burden of multiple examinations by parties other than plaintiff's
designated appraiser.

(R. at 58)

Despite prior indications by plaintiff's counsel that a
Mr. Donald Sutte had been appointed to render an appraisal of the
value of the Webbs' stock, plaintiff's counsel and various other
individuals from Peat, Marwick & Mitchell arrived at R.O.A.
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headquarters on the morning of May 27, 1987,

(R. at 37, 38, 57,

93, 94, 102) While plaintiff's counsel was at R.O.A. corporate
headquarters, defendants' counsel, William H. Adams, notifed her
that an inspection of R.O.A.'s records would not be permitted on
that date.

(R. at 37, 38, 93, 94, 102)

On May 29, 1987, plaintiff filed suit against R.O.A.,
Reagan and others, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County.

Plaintiff sought damages from R.O.A. for alleged

breach of an employment contract.

In addition, plaintiff sought

injunctive relief and statutory damages against R.O.A., Reagan and
others for their alleged wrongful refusal to permit plaintiff to
inspect the corporate records of R.O.A.

(R. at 2-9)

On June 3, 1987, plaintiff once again made demand to
inspect the books and records of R.O.A.

(R. at 59-60)

Plaintiff's

counsel indicated that the inspection would take place beginning at
10:00 a.m. on June 5, 1987.
By letter dated June 4, 1987, defendants' counsel advised
plaintiff's counsel that R.O.A. would make its employees available
to assist plaintiff's inspection beginning June 15, 1987.
61)

(R. at

Counsel was also informed that the inspection would take place

only upon the condition that the individuals examining the records
would be required to sign a confidentiality agreement prior to
beginning their inspection.

(R. at 61)

On June 15, 1987, when plaintiff's attorney and several
unidentified persons appeared at the office of R.O.A., Ms. Brieant
refused to permit any of the parties to execute the confidentiality
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agreement.

Ms. Brieant also refused to comply with the other

conditions R.O.A. had placed upon plaintiff's inspection of the
records as set forth in R.O.A.fs prior correspondence to plaintiff.
(R. at 288)

As a result, R.O.A. and Reagan declined to permit

Ms. Brieant and the others access to R.O.A.fs records.

(R. at 96)

On June 15, 1987, plaintiff filed his first Amended
Complaint, seeking additional statutory damages due to the refusal
of R.O.A. and Reagan "on three separate occasions" to permit
inspection of R.O.A.fs records.

(R. at 33-47)

One week after filing the Amended Complaint, plaintiff
moved for partial summary judgment.

(R. at 111-12)

motion was supported by various affidavits.

Plaintiff's

(R. at 89-97)

On

June 26, 1987, defendants R.O.A. and Reagan filed cross-motions for
partial summary judgment.

(R. at 128-29, 185-86) Defendants'

cross-motions for partial summary judgment were also supported by
various affidavits.

(R. at 156-58, 178-81)

On August 28, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, denied
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
defendant's cross-motions for summary judgment.

(R. at 344-45)

It is from the August 28, 1987, Order that plaintiff now appeals.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A SHAREHOLDER WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10-47 (1953).
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953) codifies the common law
rule recognized in Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 P. 729
(1908), that a shareholder has the right to inspect corporate books
and records at a reasonable time and for a reasonable purpose.
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953) provides:
Any person who is a shareholder of record, upon
written demand stating the purpose thereof,
will have the right to examine, in person, or
by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or
times, for any proper purpose, its books and
records of account, minutes and record of
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom.
A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably
related to the person's interest as a shareholder.
A "shareholder" is further defined under Utah law as "one who is a
holder of record of shares in a corporation."

Utah Code Ann.

§16-10-2(15) (1953) .
The purchase option given to R.O.A. under the Agreement
was essentially a continuing irrevocable offer of sale by the
Webbs which could not be withdrawn during the stated period.
purchase option vested in R.O.A. a power of acceptance.

The

The

Agreement contemplated that once R.O.A. accepted the Webbs' offer
in the prescribed manner, a binding bilateral contract of sale
would be created.

1A Corbin On Contracts §§259, 260, 264 (1963

ed.); 1 Williston On Contracts §§25, 61A-D (3d ed.); 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts §32 (1964); and 77 C.J.S. Sales §33(d) (1952).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Ollie v. Rainbolt, 66 9 P.2d
275 (Okla. 1983), acknowledged the binding and conclusive effect of
the exercise of a purchase option.

In Ollie, various aggrieved

stockholders brought suit claiming the defendants had violated the
terms of a stock purchase agreement.

The Oklahoma court noted the

difference between a right of first refusal agreement and a
purchase option agreement, stating:
The agreements in suit expressly state that they
grant "not an option, but rather the right of
first refusal to buy all of the stock" of the
selling shareholders. To properly construe
these agreements, we must inquire into the nature
of the preemptive right, and the legal obligations
arising thereunder.
A right of first refusal has been described as
closely related in purpose to options and yet
very dissimilar in other respects. An option is
essentially a continuing and irrevocable offer
by the optioner, which cannot be withdrawn by
him during the stated period. It vests in the
optionee what is usually termed a power of
acceptance, and when he accepts the offer in
the prescribed manner, the option is deemed to
have been exercised so as to create a binding
bilateral contract. A right of first refusal,
on the other hand, is distinguished from an
option. Because it is not an offer, it
can create no power of acceptance. The right
of preemption does not give to its holder the
power to compel an unwilling owner to sell.
Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
By exercising its purchase option on January 27, 1987,
R.O.A. accepted the plaintiff's offer of sale.
agreement, the optionor is bound to perform.

Under such an option

Upon exercise of the

option, title passes and the stock must be delivered.
On Contracts §61B (3d ed.).

1 Williston

Therefore, once the purchase option

was exercised by R.O.A., plaintiff and Bessie Webb were obligated
-10-

to comply with the Agreement by obtaining an appraisal and
tendering their stock to R.O.A.

See, Colorado Management Corp. v.

American Founders Life Ins. Co., 148 Colo. 519, 367 P.2d 335
(1961).

In accordance with the terms of the July 7, 1981 Agreement

and R.O.A.fs exercise of the purchase option provided therein on
January 27, 1987, plaintiff ceased to be a shareholder in R.O.A. on
January 27, 1987. As a result, plaintiff had no statutory right to
inspect R.O.A.fs books and records any time after January 27, 1987.
The Supreme Court of New York in In Re Gaines, 180 N.Y.S.
191 (1919), afffd, 190 App.Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920), found
under similar facts that a shareholder had lost her statutory right
of inspection.

In Gaines, plaintiff brought suit to examine certain

corporate records.

Plaintiff instituted the action claiming that

her deceased father was the recordholder of 50 shares of stock in
the corporation, and that under his will she was entitled to the
stock.

The defendant corporation denied that plaintiff was a

shareholder on the ground that she had entered into a binding
contract to sell her interest in the stock.
The court noted that the plaintiff's contract to sell the
stock was in full force and effect and the purchasing party was not
in default.

The court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff did

not have standing to inspect the corporate records:
From the facts it appears the petitioner has
only a contingent interest in the stock that
is temporarily registered in her name, and
that all the elements of a contract of absolute
sale are present. The mere fact that the stock
is registered in petitioner's name does not
constitute her a stockholder in the sense
-11-

necessary to entitle her to maintain this
proceeding.
Id. at 192 (citations omitted).
Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff and his wife were and
are bound to transfer their stock to R.O.A.

Exercise of the

purchase option by R.O.A. created a binding bilateral contract
enforceable through specific performance.

While the plaintiff1s

stock remains temporarily registered in his name, all the elements
of a binding contract of absolute sale are present.

The mere fact

that the stock is registered in his name does not mean that he is a
"shareholder" within the purview of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b).
Plaintiff1s attempt to claim the status of a shareholder
by failing to comply with his obligations under the Agreement
cannot give him greater rights than he is entitled to under the
Agreement.

When a contract contemplates action on behalf of a

party, he cannot absolve himself of liability by failing or
refusing to take the required action.
317, 417 P.2d 823 (1966).

Caldeira v. Sokei, 49 Hawaii

It is axiomatic that a person cannot

breach a contract and then use his failure of performance to assert
rights against a non-breaching party.
Defendant R.O.A. properly exercised its purchase option in
accordance with the Agreement.

By so doing, R.O.A. accepted the

plaintiff's offer of sale in the prescribed manner, thereby
creating a binding bilateral contract.

R.O.A. stands ready and

willing to perform under the terms of the Agreement.

R.O.A.

awaits only for the plaintiff to fulfill his obligations under the
Agreement.

R.O.A. was entitled to delivery of plaintiff's shares
-12-

as of July 27, 1987. Title to the shares vested in defendant
R.O.A. on July 27, 1987, Therefore, plaintiff should not be
accorded the rights of a shareholder under Utah Code Ann.
§16-10-47(b).
Plaintiff asserts that he must be deemed to be a
"shareholder," due to the fact that he has not been paid for his
stock.

The Agreement does not provide that payment is a condition

precedent to the formation of a binding bilateral contract of sale.
In fact, if the appraiser determines the stock to be valueless,
there would be no need for payment.
irrelevant.

The issue of payment is

The sole question that must be determined is whether

the contract of sale was in full force and effect and that there
had been no default on the part of R.O.A. at the time the option
was exercised.

Gaines, 180 N.Y.S.

at 192. The passing of title

is not predicated upon payment of the purchase price.
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations

12A Fletcher

§5628 (rev. perm,

ed. 1972).
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy
Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967), held that title
to stock may be transferred pursuant to a purchase agreement before
payment has been received.

Tracy arose from an agreement whereby

the plaintiff agreed to sell his stock in the defendant corporation
in consideration for installment payments secured by a chattel
mortgage on certain corporate equipment.

Plaintiff endorsed his

stock certificates in blank and delivered the stock to defendant.
The corporation thereafter desposited the shares in escrow.
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When

the corporation defaulted on the installment payments, plaintiff
foreclosed on the equipment.

Following an award of damages in the

foreclosure proceeding, defendant appealed.
In affirming the trial court's award of damages, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals considered whether the parties'
agreement transferred title of the stock from plaintiff to the
defendant corporation.

The Minnesota court held:

It is clear to us that the agreement of July 31,
1959, served to transfer the title of the stock
owned by plaintiff to defendant corporation.
See, Minn. St. 301.02 Susbd. 7; Wolff v. Heidritter
Lbr. Co., 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140; Beal v.
Essex Sav. Bank (C.C.D. Mass. (67 F. 816)).
Tracy, 153 N.W.2d at 245.

See also, Currey v. Willard Steam

Service, 321 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958) (under terms of contact of sale
plaintiff was not entitled to any share of

dividends accrued after

entering contract of sale, even though the full purchase price had
not been paid).
Plaintiff likewise contends that the passing of title is
dependent upon actual delivery of his stock certificate.

It is

well established that actual delivery of the certificate is not
necessarily essential to the passing of title.

12A Fletcher

Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §5626 (rev. perm. ed.
1972).

One noted treatise states:
In preceding sections, it is pointed out that a
stockholder is one who owns stock in a corporation,
and that a certificate of stock is not the stock
itself, but merely the written evidence of the
stockholder's rights as such. It is a necessary
conclusion therefrom that issuance of a certificate of stock is not necessary to make one a
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stockholder. And it is well settled, as a
general rule of corporation law that . . . a
purchaser of stock, becomes a stockholder as
soon as . . . the purchase is completed, as the
case may be, whether a certificate of stock is
issued to the purchaser or not; and, although
the purchaser may have no certificate, the
purchaser is thereupon entitled to all the
rights, and is subject to all the liabilities
of a stockholder.
* * *

[W]here an actual sale has been made and the
title to the stock has passed • . . the purchaser
is a stockholder though no certificate has been
issued to the purchaser . . . .
11 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations §5094
(rev. perm. ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court in Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco
Polo, 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965), recognized that stock
ownership is not dependent upon physical possession of the
corresponding stock certificates.

In Owyhee, the plaintiff sued

and obtained judgment against Robbins, Inc.

Thereafter, plaintiff

issued a garnishment against a Mr. Luman, contending that he had
money belonging to Robbins, Inc.

Plaintiff claimed that Robbins,

Inc. had improperly repurchased some of its own stock from Luman,
thereby impairing its capital.

The trial court denied recovery on

the garnishment.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court
erred in refusing to find that the transaction was a repurchase of
stock by Robbins, Inc.

In affirming the lower court's ruling, the

Utah Supreme Court noted that possession of a stock certificate is
merely evidence of stock ownership.
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Owyhee, 407 P.2d at 567.

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Davies v. Semloh
Hotel, 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935), holds that title to stock
purchased under a binding contract of sale vests at the time the
contract is entered into.

In Davies, the defendant offered

plaintiff $500 in cash and 27 shares of stock in the J.C. Penney
Company in return for plaintiff's agreement to work for the
defendant's hotel.

The employment contract also obligated

plaintiff to purchase 1,600 shares of the capital stock of the
defendant corporation.

In addition, the contract provided that if

plaintiff was ever fired, the hotel would repurchase the stock at
the price of $1.00 per share.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant

from July 13, 19 3 3 until August 24, 1933.

Immediately following

his firing, plaintiff demanded payment for his stock.

Defendant

refused.
At trial, the central issue was whether the plaintiff had
been discharged.

The jury found in favor of plaintiff, and entered

a judgment for the amount specified in the employment contract for
the stock.
On appeal, defendant contended that it was not obligated
to purchase the stock from plaintiff.

The Utah Supreme Court

rejected the defendant's argument, and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.

The court stated:
Under the terms of the contract in the
instant case, if it was "agreed that if at
any time the second party should see fit to
discharge and thus discontinue the services
of the first party for cause or otherwise,
then and in that event the second party
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agrees to repurchase the stock of the second
party now held by the first party at par
value of One ($1.00) Dollar per share."
Under the terms of the contract whether or
not the property in the stock passed to the
buyer, the defendant was bound by his
contract to repurchase and pay for the
stock . . . . This transaction did not
contemplate an option on the part of the
defendant to repurchase the stock, nor did
it constitute what might be termed an offer
to purchase the stock. It was a binding
contract upon both parties subject only to a
condition subsequent, viz., the discharge of
the plaintiff from the employment
contemplated in the contract. The condition
subsequent having been fulfilled in the
discharge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff
having made tender of the stock, there would
seem to be no good reason why he should not
recover. It was the clear intention of the
parties that the title of the stock should
pass to the defendant upon the happening of
the events as outlined upon which defendant
became bound to pay.
Davies, 44 P.2d at 690-91.

(Emphasis added.)

The Utah Supreme Court in Taylor v. Paynes, 118 Utah 72,
218 P.2d 1069 (1950), clearly held that title to stock transfers
upon the execution of a binding contract of sale, even though
delivery and endorsement of the shares has not yet taken place.
Taylor arose out of a dispute between Marvin S.

Taylor and J. Fred

Daynes, both shareholders in the Daynes Optical Company.

Soon

after the optical company was formed, the parties had sharp
disagreements regarding the operation of the corporation.

Taylor

expressed a desire to sell his stock and discontinue his
affiliation with the company.

On July 20, 1947, the active

corporate directors met to discuss the purchase of Taylor's stock.
On Monday, July 21, 1947, Taylor took his stock certificate to the
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office of defendant.

Defendant accepted the stock certificate and

dictated and signed the following:
To whom it may concern: This is to advise
that J. Fred Daynes, John F. Daynes, and
Lincoln A. Daynes have this day purchased
from Marvin S. Taylor stock certificate
number 2, being all of his stock and interest
in the Daynes Optical Company. Respectfully
(signed) J. Fred Daynes.
Defendant kept the stock certificate for several months.
When plaintiff failed to receive any money for the stock, he took
back the stock certificate in February, 1948.

Plaintiff later

endorsed and return the stock certificate to defendant.
On April 22, 1948, plaintiff filed suit against
defendant, alleging the purchase and sale of his stock certificate
and claiming $6,000 plus interest as payment for said stock.
After defendant introduced evidence at trial to support his
defense, the trial court found that the defendant had purchased
the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and entered judgment in
favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, the defendant contended that there could not
have been a sale on July 21, 1947, since existing Utah law
prohibited the consummation of a stock sale prior to the time the
stock certificate was endorsed.

The Utah Supreme Court squarely

rejected the defendant's argument, and stated:
We are of the opinion that the contract as
established is not executory, but is a
contract of present purchase and sale. This
court, in the case of Jones v. Commercial
Investment Trust, 64 Utah 151, at page 163,
228 P. 896, at page 900, discussed the
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differences between a sale and a contract to
sell. Woolley, District Judge, speaking for
this court, explained the distinction as
follows:
A sale involves a present transfer of
the title in the goods from the seller
to the buyer. A contract to sell
implies that the title in the goods
remains vested in the seller and is to
be transferred to the buyer at some
future time. Whether a contract is one
of sale or an executory contract to
sell depends always upon what the
parties to it intend in regard to the
time when the title in the property is
to go to the buyer. If they intend the
title to be transferred when the
contract is made, it is a contract of
sale; otherwise it is a contract to
sell. The intention of the parties is
the important and controlling fact to
be considered and given effect in
determining the nature of a contract in
this regard. There may be a sale, a
present passing of the title,
notwithstanding that by the terms of
the agreement the right to the
possession of the thing sold is
retained by the seller until the
purchase price is paid. The intention
must be determined from a consideration
of the nature and terms of the
contract, usages of trade, the conduct
of the parties, and the circumstances
of the case. If no contrary intention
appears from such a consideration, then
the law presumes, where the contract
pertains to a specific chattel, in a
deliverable state, that the parties
intend the title to pass when the
contract is made, and this is true
regardless of the fact that payment of
the price or delivery of the goods, or
both, be postponed.
Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1072 (emphasis in original).
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Utah
Supreme Court cited with approval its earlier decision in Davies
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v. Semioh Hotel, Inc., 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935).

In

holding that title to the stock had vested in the defendant,
thereby obligating him to pay for the stock, the Taylor court stated:
This being an action to recover the contract
price of $6,000 and the trial court having
found that the contract was one of immediate
purchase, the time of indorsement is not
material to appellant's liability so long as
the indorsement is made upon tender of the
purchase price. If, on July 21, 1947, the
appellant obligated himself to pay for the
purchase price of this stock, then the mere
fact that transfer was not made would not
defeat respondent's right to recover.
*

*

*

The appellant acquired an interest in
the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and
should not escape paying therefor.
Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1073-74 (emphasis added).
Cases from other jurisdictions, dealing with the issue of
whether a stockholder retains a right of inspection after entering
into a binding contract of sale, provide persuasive evidence that
the trial court in the instant case committed no error in holding
that plaintiff had no right of inspection.

In Nash v. Gay Apparel

Corp., 11 Misc.2d 768, 175 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1958), the court held
under similar facts that the stockholder had no right to inspect
the books and records of the corporate defendant.

The plaintiff in

Nash had contracted to sell his stock to the defendant corporation.
At the time plaintiff made demand to inspect defendant's records,
the stock was still registered in his name.

The plaintiff sought

to inspect the corporate books on the grounds that he was a
corporate shareholder.

In rejecting the plaintiff's demand, the
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court held:
It appears from the petition and the terms
of the contract annexed thereto that
petitioner has only a contingent interest in
the stock which is still registered in his
name. Under the contract petitioner sold
his stock to the corporation. The stock is
held in escrow pending final payment of the
purchase price. Outside of the right to
have the stock returned to him in the event
of the purchaser's default, petitioner
transferred all his rights in and to the
stock to the corporation. Under these
circumstances petitioner, having sold his
stock, cannot obtain an inspection of the
corporate records.
While petitioner is afforded the right
of inspection under the contract, he may not
enforce the right by way of an Article 78,
Civil Practice Act proceeding.
Nash, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (citations omitted).
A similar result was reached in Dierking v. Associated
Books Service, Inc., 31 Misc.2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1960).
Plaintiff in Dierking sought an order permitting him to inspect
the books and records of the defendant corporation.

At the time

of his demand, the plaintiff was under contract to sell his stock.
The court rejected the plaintiff's demand, stating:
The issue arises upon the alleged fact that
the petitioner is under contract to sell the
stock of the corporation held by him and
that the buyer has instituted an action
against the petitioner for specific
performance compelling delivery of the
certificate of stock representing the shares
thus sold. in that action it appears that
petitioner, as defendant, has raised a
defense that the contract is unenforceable
by reason of the fact that the stock must
first be offered to the other stockholders
of the corporation, the individual
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respondents. The respondents, the remaining
stockholders, have waived any right of first
offer and consent to the sale by the
petitioner to its contracting buyer,
Accordingly, petitioner does not have
such interest in any of the stock of the
corporation as would warrant favorable
consideration of the application, or a
finding that it is made in good faith. The
motion is denied.
Dierking, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 730.

See also Rosenberg v. Steinberg-

Kass, Inc., 18 Misc.2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1959).
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish many of the above-cited
authorities on the grounds that the shareholders in those cases
had either received payment for their shares, endorsed the shares
and delivered them to an escrow, or had sold the stock and been
paid in full.

While the cases cited herein may not be on all fours

with the instant case, the principles enunciated in those cases
control the resolution of this appeal.

Each of the above-cited

authorities stands for the proposition that once a shareholder
enters into a binding contract of sale, title to the stock is
immediately transferred from that stockholder to the purchasing
party.
Once a contract of sale is entered into, through the
exercise of an option or the occurrence of some event, title to the
stock passes and the shareholder no longer has any statutory right
of inspection,

what title or right to the stock remains in the

shareholder is wholly inadequate to maintain a cause of action such
as the present case.

The trial court did not, therefore, err in

finding that plaintiff had no right to inspect the books and
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records of ROA pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §16-10-47(b).
Plaintiff's sole right of inspection was that accorded to him
pursuant to the appraisal clause of the parties' Agreement.
POINT II.
EVEN ASSUMING PLAINTIFF RETAINED HIS STATUS
AS A SHAREHOLDER, PLAINTIFF CONTRACTED AWAY
HIS STATUTORY RIGHT OF INSPECTION.
The parties' Agreement provides that upon R.O.A.'s
election to purchase plaintiff's outstanding shares that plaintiff
is entitled to conduct an independent appraisal to determine the
value of the corporate stock.

Since this appraisal right serves

the same purpose as the statutory right of inspection, the
Agreement reflects the parties' intention that the contractual
right of appraisal supersede and replace any statutory right of
inspection.

It is well established that, in the absence of an

express statutory provision, parties may enter into contracts
abrogating or limiting statutory provisions which confer a right or
benefit upon one or both parties.

Francam Building Corp. v. Fail,

646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982), appeal after remand, 687 P.2d 991 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984) .
Plaintiff contends that he retained his statutory right of
inspection, despite R.O.A.'s purchase of his stock pursuant to the
Agreement.

Plaintiff asserts that every court that has ruled under

similar circumstances has held that the shareholder retains his
statutory right of inspection, i.e., Estate of Bishop v. Antilles
Enterprises, Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1958); Knaebel v. Heiner,
673 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1983); Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 130 Ga. App.
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859, 204 S.E.2d 810 (1974); and Hoover v. Fox Rig and Lumber Co.,
199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948).
However, each of the cases relied on by plaintiff is
incontrovertibly distinguishable from the instant case.

First, the

cited cases involve executory contracts, where the sale of the
stock is contingent upon some discretionary act.

The instant case,

however, involves a binding bilateral contract of sale. While
several acts, including the setting of the purchase price and
delivery of the stock, remain to be performed in the future, R.O.A.
has irrevocably bound itself to purchase plaintiff's stock.
Second, none of the cited cases involve purchase contracts with
accompanying rights of appraisal.

Whereas the cited cases involved

various contracts to purchase stock dependent upon the parties'
negotiating and agreeing on a sales price, the purchase price of
plaintiff's stock was to be set by independent appraisal.

Pursuant

to the Agreement, once the appraisal process is completed, R.O.A.
is bound to pay whatever value is placed on the stock by the
appraisal.

R.O.A. has no power to revoke its purchase if it

disagrees with the results of the appraisal.
Following R.O.A.'s purchase of plaintiff's stock, the
parties intended that the stock's value be determined in accordance
with the parties' Agreement.

It would be totally inconsistent with

the terms of the Agreement to find that the parties contemplated
that plaintiff would be allowed not only his rights of appraisal,
but also the rights accorded him under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b)
(1953).

The only reasonable interpretation of the Agreement is
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that corporation.

It is undisputed that plaintiff had previously

reviewed, both personally and by his accountant, the same books and
records of R.O.A. he now seeks to inspect-

The plaintiff's failure

to demand a formal statutory inspection of the corporate records
prior to R.O.A.fs election to purchase his stock suggests strongly
that the plaintiff's demands are meant solely to vex and harass the
defendants.

Under such circumstances, courts have denied or

severely limited the scope of the shareholder's statutory right of
inspection.

See Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d

674 (Del. 1978); and Foss v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241
111. 238, 89 N.E. 351 (1909).
The Utah Supreme Court in Clawson v. Clayton, 3 3 Utah 266,
93 P.2d 729, 731 (Utah 1908), recognized the right of a corporation
to refuse a stockholder inspection when the demand is unreasonable
or for an improper purpose:
When a demand is made which, under the circumstances, is unreasonable, and is sought to
be exercised in an unreasonable manner, or for
illegitimate reasons, the corporation may
refuse it.
It is clear from Clawson that a shareholder must demand inspection
at reasonable times which would not unnecessarily impede or
interfere with the ongoing operation of the corporation.

See

Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011 (1930); and Goddard v.
General Reduction and Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103
(1920).

In addition, a demand to inspect a corporation's books and

records may be properly denied if the needed information is
available in other, less inconvenient, ways.
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See Annot., 15

A.L.R.2d 11, 45 (1951).

The parties' Agreement provides that an

appraisal will be conducted by a third party to determine the value
of the stock.

There is, therefore, no apparent reason for

plaintiff to burden R.O.A. with multiple inspections, unless the
inspections are directly related to the appraisal process.
Defendants maintain that the only reason plaintiff is demanding to
review R.O.A.'s records pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) is
to harass and vex defendants, and thereby obtain some advantage in
arriving at a favorable sale price for his stock.

This is clearly

not a proper purpose and should not be sanctioned by this Court.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff properly invoked his
statutory right of inspection, plaintiff's demands have been
unreasonable.

Unreasonable demands or demands exercised in an

unreasonable manner may be refused by R.O.A.

Defendants submit

that the records and books of R.O.A. contain various trade secrets
and other information, which if leaked or revealed to competitors,
could severely damage the economic viability of R.O.A.'s operations.
(R. at 288)

Due to the sensitive nature of corporate records,

courts have permitted corporations to require non-disclosure
assurances from shareholders.

In CM&M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453

A.2d 788, 794 (Del. 1982), the Delaware Supreme Court, in remanding
an action back to the trial court, ordered that the lower court's
judgment be modified to provide that:
Any inspection by Carroll [the plaintiff
shareholder] under the Trial Court's Order
shall be contingent upon a requirement that
neither the plaintiff nor any agent of his
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shall disclose information obtained as a
result of these proceedings to anyone who
has not first made a written representation
to the plaintiff that he is a bona fide
prospective purchaser of Carroll's stock and
executed an agreement of confidentiality.
Defendants repeatedly requested that plaintiff and
plaintiff's agents sign a confidentiality agreement prior to their
inspection of the books and records of R.O.A.
plaintiff's agents refused.

Plaintiff and

Due to the plaintiff's failure to

agree to a condition of confidentiality surrounding his inspection
of R.O.A. records, his demand could not be considered reasonable.
Defendants' refusal to permit plaintiff to inspect the
corporate records of R.O.A. was further supported by evidence that
plaintiff on a prior occasion had taken unfair advantage of a
corporate opportunity while serving as a director of another
corporation.

(R. at 158, 215-16)

Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c)

provides that a corporation may refuse to open its books for
inspection where the shareholder "has improperly used any
information secured through any prior examination of the books and
records of account, or minutes, or record of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation . . . ."

(Emphasis added.)

The determination of whether a shareholder has acted
reasonably in making demand upon a corporation to inspect its
records is a matter more properly left to the trial court.

The New

Mexico Supreme Court in Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99
N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983), held that a trial court has
discretion to determine when and in what manner the right of
examination by shareholders should be exercised.
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Schwartzman arose

when a group of minority shareholders of a closely-held family
corporation brought suit alleging that the majority shareholders
had engaged in oppressive and harmful conduct against the minority
shareholders and the corporate entity.

The trial court severely

limited the minority shareholders' review of the corporate books
and records, and refused to impose the statutory penalties for the
corporate officers' refusal to allow the shareholders' examination.
In affirming the lower court's action, the court stated:
A trial court must of necessity have some
discretion determining when and in what
manner the right of examination should be
exercised. Under the facts in this case, it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to limit examination to regular
business hours in addition to the 222 hours
examination which had previously been
allowed.
Id. at 892.
In the instant case, defendants suggested that the
plaintiff's inspection be conducted in such a way as to minimize
disruption of R.O.A.'s ongoing business operations.

Defendants

suggested that the inspections take place during four-hour periods
per day at a time amenable to both parties.

Plaintiff refused.

Due to the fact that plaintiff had the opportunity to review the
books and records of R.O.A. over a lengthy period of time, while
serving as a director of the corporation, the limitations
suggested by the defendants were reasonable.

-29-

POINT IV,
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS,
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST THAT PRECLUDE
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.
If this court should find that plaintiff had a statutory
right to inspect the books and records of R.O.A., numerous material
issues of fact exist that prevent this Court from entering an ordei
directing the trial court to grant plaintiff1s motion for partial
summary judgment.

See, Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants respectfully submit that while the determination of
whether plaintiff had a statutory right of inspection is a questior.
of law, the determination of whether plaintiff requested such an
inspection at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose, and
whether defendants1 refusal to permit such an inspection was
wrongful are clearly questions of fact.

See, Curkendall v. United

Federation of Correction Officers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 935, 483
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1985); and DePaula v. Memory Gardens, Inc.,
90 A.D.2d 886, 456 N.Y.S.2d 522, 524 (1982).
The record clearly demonstrates that defendants believed
that plaintiff's demand was not at a reasonable time nor for a
proper purpose.

Defendants repeatedly attempted to assist

plaintiff in his attempt to review the books and records of R.O.A.
Issues of fact remain as to whether plaintiff g~ave~adequate notice
to defendants before demanding inspection of the R.O.A. books and
records.

Issues of fact remain as to whether the plaintiff's

demands were reasonable due to their particular timing in relation
to the accounting practices of R.O.A. and the availability of
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trained help to assist in the inspection.

Issues of fact remain as

to whether the scope of the requested inspection exceeded the
bounds of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances in
this case.

The determination of these critical issues of material

fact requires far more evidence and facts than appears in the
record on appeal.

Indeed, each of these material issues of fact

should be resolved by a trier of fact, rather than by this Court on
appeal.
Even if plaintiff is found to have a statutory right of
inspection, there are substantial issues of material fact as to
whether plaintiff's demands were for a reasonable purpose.

Issues

of fact remain as to whether defendant's refusal was justified due
to their interpretation of the parties' Agreement.

Issues of fact

remain as to whether the defendants' actions were justified due to
the plaintiff's refusal to guarantee the confidentiality of the
R.O.A. records.

Issues of fact remain as to whether the

defendants' refusal to permit the inspection of the R.O.A. books
was justified due to the plaintiff's alleged prior usurpation of a
corporate business opportunity.

The record on appeal is less than

clear as to whether the plaintiff's demand to inspect was for a
proper purpose, as required under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b)
(1953).

The propriety of plaintiff's demand should^ therefore, be

resolved by a trier of fact, rather than by this Court.
In view of the numerous substantial issues of material
fact that exist in the record on appeal, this Court should not rule
as a matter of law that defendants' refusal was wrongful or
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unlawful.

The determination of these issues, if necessary to the

resolution of this dispute, should be made by the trial court.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO MULTIPLE STATUTORY
PENALTIES FOR DEFENDANTS1 REFUSAL TO PERMIT
ACCESS TO R.O.A.'S BOOKS AND RECORDS.
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) provides that any
officer, agent or corporation which refuses to allow a shareholder
to examine and make extracts from corporate books and records
"shall be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of the
value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to any
other damages or remedy afforded him by loss; but no penalty shall
exceed $5,000."
Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to an award under
the statutory penalty provision of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) as a
matter of law.

In addition, plaintiff asserts that he is entitled

to "an award of three statutory penalties" for the defendants1
refusal on "three separate occasions . . . to allow Webb, his
agents and attorneys, to examine and make extracts from R.O.A.'s
books and records of account."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 25)

Plaintiff urges this court to broadly construe Utah Code
Ann. §16-10-47(c) to permit an award of multiple statutory
penalties for what he characterizes as three separate refusals. It
is well established that such statutory penalty provisions are
penal in nature, and are therefore subject to the rule of strict
interpretation.

Padovano v. Wotizky, 355 So.2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1978); and 18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations §421 (1985).
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Since the

Utah statute is silent on the availability of multiple statutory
penalty awards, this Court should rule as a matter of law that such
multiple awards are forbidden.

Assuming arguendo that multiple

penalties are available under Utah law, the matter should be
remanded to the trial court for a determination of how many, if
any, refusals the defendant made.

See Meyer v. Ford Industries,

Inc., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353 (1975).
CONCLUSION
Defendants' election on January 27, 1987, to exercise its
option of purchase divested plaintiff of his status as a
shareholder within the scope of Utah Code Ann.

§16-10-47(b).

parties' Agreement provided for a binding contract of sale.

The

Once

the option was exercised, title to the stock transferred from
plaintiff to defendant R.O.A.

Plaintiff's demand to inspect the

corporate records of R.O.A. in May and June, 1987, was, therefore,
outside the scope of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b).

Even if

plaintiff retained his status as a shareholder, plaintiff's
statutory right of inspection was waived under the terms of the
parties' Agreement.

Substantial evidence exists that plaintiff's

demand was not made at a reasonable time nor for a proper purpose.
The reasonableness and appropriateness of plaintiff's demand
necessarily involve substantial issues of fact that preclude the
entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiff on
appeal.

Even if the defendants' refusal was wrongful or unlawful,

Utah law precludes the awarding of multiple statutory penalties
against defendants as a matter of law.
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Defendants, therefore, respectfully request that the
judgment of the trial court granting partial summary judgment in
favor of defendants be affirmed
affirmed.
DATED this

\*H

-^

day of

\ ^J>\1

STRONG & HANNI

1988
-A

By

_ _

PHILIP R. FISHLER
DENNIS M. ASTILL
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Reagan
DOUGLAS T. HALL
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
R.O.A.
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent were hand delivered this
gt_,

1988, to the following:

CAROL GOODMAN, Esq.
VAL J. CHRISTENSEN, Esq.
VICTORIA E. BRIEANT, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant
LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE
136 South Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 #
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-2(15) (1953)
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a
holder of record of shares in a corporation•
Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-47(b) and (c) (1953)
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of
record, upon written demand stating the purpose
thereof, shall have the right to examine, in
person, or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable
time or times, for any proper purpose, its books
and records of account, minutes and record of
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom. A
proper purpose means a propose reasonably related
to the personfs interest as a shareholder,
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder,
or his agent or attorney, so to examine and make
extracts from its books and records of account,
minutes, and record of shareholders, for any
proper purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of the value of the
shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to
any other damages or remedy afforded him by law;
but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall
be a defense to any action for penalties under
this section that the person suing therefor has
within two years sold or offered for sale any
list of shareholders of such corporation or any
other corporation or has aided or abetted any
person in procuring any list of shareholders for
any such purpose, or has improperly used any
information secured through any prior examination
of the books and records of account, or minutes,
or record of shareholders of such corporation or
any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand.
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January 27, 1987
CERTIFIED MAIL and
HAND DELIVERED

Mr. Roland Webb and
Mrs. Bessie P. Webb
1837 Baywood Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dear Roland and Bessie:
This letter is to notify you that R.O.A. General, Inc. is hereby
exercising its option under paragraph 11 of that Agreement by and
between William K. Reagan, Roland Webb, Bessie P. Webb and R.O.A.
General, Inc. to purchase all of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock
owned by the two of you.
At your earliest convenience, we should meet to discuss
information which I have concerning the value of the R.O.A.
General, Inc. stock. Also, we need to discuss the other aspects
of the transaction.
Very truly yours,
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC.

WKR/so

A-2
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. • 1775 North 900 West • Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 • (801) 521-1

Exhibit
1
AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made this _/

day of July, 1981, by and

among WILLIAM K. REAGAN, hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"Reagan" and ROLAND WEBB and BESSIE P. WEBB, hereinafter sometimes
collectively referred to as "Webb", all of the above hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as "the Stockholders" and each
singly as "Stockholder", and R.O.A. General, Inc., d/b/a Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as
"the Corporation",
Recitals:
A,

The Stockholders, as incorporators, will organize a

corporation under the laws of the State of Utah, the Corporation,
for the purpose of engaging in operating an outdoor advertising
business, including the borrowing of money for such purpose, and to
engage in any other lawful business activity.
B.

The Stockholders will own all of the outstanding common

stock of the Corporation, hereinafter, including any such stock
issued hereafter, referred to as the "Stock,"
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
herein contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the
parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Sale of Stock.

Reagan hereby agrees to sell to Webb

shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

The amount of

stock shall be determined based upon the relative net worth of
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. on the date the Corporation purchases the stock of Galaxy
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. which is not owned by Webb, hereinafter
referred to as "Closing Date".

It has been agreed that the value of

Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is $3,163,202 plus the amount of
cash, prepaid expenses, and the value of notes and accounts
receivables as of the Closing Date minus all liabilities at the
Closing Date, and the value of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is
$5,100,000 plus the amount of cash, prepaid expenses, and the value

A-3

of notes and accounts receivables as of the Closing Date minus all
liabilities, excluding deferred income taxes, at the Closing Date.
Current assets and liabilities of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. shall be determined using
consistent accounting principles.

The value of the stock to be

purchased by Webb shall be the difference between

(i) the value of

Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc. minus $255,727 divided by
20 percent; and (ii) the total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. and Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc.

The purchase

price shall be paid by a demand promissory note with interest at the
rate provided in paragraph 12.2(c) (ii).

Provided, however, Reagan

shall not be required to sell stock that would result in his owning
less than 66-2/3 percent of the sto.ck of the Corporation.
2.

Subscription for Stock.
2.1

Stock Issued to Reagan.

In exchange for all of

the shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by
Reagan, after making the sale as provided in paragraph 1 above,
the Corporation shall issue to Reagan such shares that his
percentage ownership of the outstanding stock of the Corporation
shall equal the percentage determined by dividing

(i) the value

of the Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. stock, as defined in
paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the total value of
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of Webb's stock
of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in paragraph 1.
2.2

Stock Issued to Webb.

In exchange for all of the

shares of stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by Webb, after making the
purchase as provided in paragraph 1 above, the Corporation shall
issue to Webb such shares that his percentage ownership of the
outstanding stock of the Corporation shall equal the percentage
determined by dividing

(i) the value of the Reagan Outdoor

Advertising, Inc. stock and the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
stock, as defined in paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the
total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of

"2"
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Webb's stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in
paragraph 1.
3.

Pledge of Stock.

No Stockholder shall, at any time,

transfer any*of his or her stock to any person other than the
Corporation, or a corporation which is a member of an affiliated
group, as amended, which includes the Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as a "Subsidiary", as security for any loan or other
obligation unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written
consent of the holders of at least a majority of the Stock then
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

In

the event stock is pledged to the Corporation or a Subsidiary, such
pledgee shall be subject to paragraph 5 of this Agreement in the
event of any sale of such Stock by-such pledgee.
4.

Gifts of Stock.

No Stockholder shall transfer any of

his or her Stock other than for a valuable consideration (in which
event such transfer shall be subject to the provisions of either
paragraph 3 or 5 hereof) to any person other than (i) the
Corporation, or (ii) a Stockholder's spouse, one or more of his or
her lineal descendants, or a trust of which the foregoing or any of
them are the primary beneficiaries and such person(s) has agreed in
a writing filed with the Secretary of the Corporation prior to such
transfer to be bound by all the terms of this Agreement in all
respects as though such person were originally a party hereto,
unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written consent to
such transfer of the holders of a majority of the Stock then
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
5.

Rights of First Refusal Upon Any Sale of Stock.
5.1

Notice of Intended Transfer.

Any Stockholder who

intends to transfer any of his or her Stock for a valuable
consideration to any person other than the Corporation (as
hereinafter defined) shall give seventy (70) days' prior written
notice of such intended transfer, hereinafter referred to as
"the Notice", to the Corporation and to each Stockholder.

The

Notice, in addition to stating the fact of the intention so to

-3-
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transfer such Stock, shall state (i) the number of shares of
Stock to be transferred, (ii) the name, business and residence
address of the proposed transferee, and (iii) the amount or
market value of the consideration, hereinafter referred to as
the "Price", and all other terms of the intended transfer.
5.2

Primary Options to Purchase.

At any time within

thirty (30) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation,
the Corporation shall have the option to purchase all of the
Stock described in the Notice for the Price and upon terms not
less favorable to the Corporation than those granted the
proposed transferee.

Provided, however, if the proposed

transfer would not result in the recognition of gain for income
tax purposes, the price shall "be increased to include the amount
of tax liability the Stockholder would recognize upon the
exercise of the Option.

Such option shall be exercisable by the

Corporation giving the transferring Stockholder, prior to the
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, a written notice of
its exercise of its option with respect to all of the Stock
described in the Notice.

If the Corporation does not exercise

the option, it shall, not later than five (5) days after the
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, advise each
Stockholder (other than the transferring Stockholder) of the
date on which the Corporation received the Notice and of that
such option was not so exercised by the Corporation? provided,
however, that any failure or delay of the Corporation in giving
such advice to such Stockholders shall not in any way affect the
options of such Stockholders with respect to such Stock.
Any time within sixty (60) days after receipt of the
Notice by the Corporation, each Stockholder then holding Stock
(other than the transferring Stockholder) shall have the option
to purchase, for the Price and upon terms not less favorable to
such Stockholder than those granted the proposed transferee, all
or any portion of that proportion of the Stock described in the
Notice with respect to which the Corporation has not exercised

-4-
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its option which equals the proportion which the number of
shares of Stock owned by such Stockholder at the time of receipt
of the Notice by the Corporation is of the total number of
shares of Stock then owned by all such Stockholders.

Each such

option shall be exercisable by the exercising Stockholder giving
the transferring Stockholder and the Corporation, prior to the
expiration of said sixty (60) day period, a written notice of
their exercise of such option.
The options granted under this paragraph 5.2 are
sometimes hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Primary
Options" and singly as the "Primary Option".
5.3

Secondary Options to Purchaser.

If, upon the

expiration of sixty (60) days'after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation, the Primary Options have not been exercised as
hereinabove provided with respect to all of the Stock described
in the Notice, each Stockholder who has theretofore exercised
his or her Primary Option as to all Stock which was subject
thereto shall have the further, option to purchase, for the Price
and upon terms not less favorable to such Stockholder than those
granted the proposed transferee, any shares of the Stock
described in the Notice with respect to which the Primary
Options were not exercised, hereinafter referred to as the
"Secondary Option Shares".

Such further options are hereinafter

sometimes referred to collectively as the "Secondary Options"
and singly as the "Secondary Option".
If, under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph
5.3, only one Stockholder shall have a Secondary Option, then
such Secondary Option shall be exercisable with respect to all
or any portion of the number of Secondary Option Shares which
bears the same proportion to the total number of such Secondary
Option Shares as the number of shares of such Stock owned at the
time of receipt by the Corporation of the Notice by each
Stockholder having a Secondary Option bears to the total number
of shares of such Stock then owned by all Stockholders having a
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Secondary Option; provided, however, that all such Stockholders
having a Secondary Option may by agreement among themselves
determine the proportions in which some or all of them may
exercise^their respective Secondary Options.
Each Secondary Option shall be exercisable by the
exercising Stockholder giving the transferring Stockholder and
the Corporation a written notice of such exercise at any time
within seventy (70) days after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation.
5.4
Options.

Condition of Exercise of Primary and Secondary

A condition precedent to the exercise of the Primary

and Secondary Options shall be that all Stock being offered for
transfer must be purchased pursuant to the exercise of the
Primary and Secondary Options.
5.5

Transfer After Termination of Options.

Any Stock

with respect to which none of the options hereinabove provided
for has been exercised may be transferred by the transferring
Stockholder to the proposed transferee free of any rights or
duties created by this Agreement'provided that such transfer is
completed upon the same terms specified in the Notice within
ninety (90) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation.
If for any reason said transfer is not so completed within said
ninety (90) day period, then the transferring Stockholder may
not thereafter transfer any such Stock without giving a new
Notice as provided in paragraph 5.1 hereof, in which event such
Stock shall again become subject to all of the options
hereinabove provided for.

Provided, however, if Reagan proposes

to transfer Stock representing 50 percent or more of the Stock
of the Corporation and options hereinabove provided have not
been exercised, prior to the transfer of such Stock, Reagan
shall provide that Webb's Stock can be transferred, at Webb's
option, on the same terms and conditions.
5.6

If the transferring Stockholder xdies within the

seventy (70) days period referred to in paragraph 5.1 of this
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Agreement, the provisions of paragraphs 6,1 through 7.2 of this
Agreement, inclusive, shall become applicable to all Stock owned
by such transferring Stockholder other than Stock, if any,
subject to an option under this paragraph 5 which has been
exercised pursuant to the terms of this Agreement prior to the
death of such Stockholder.
6.

Options and Transfers After Death of Reagan.
6.1

Upon the death of Reagan, at the election of

Reagan's personal representative, the Corporation shall be
required to purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Reagan at
the time of his death, as hereinafter provided, if all of the
following conditions precedent have been or are concurrently
satisfied:
(a)

This Agreement continues in effect and has

not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15.
(b)

Within a reasonable time after the death of

Reagan but within nine (9) months an authorized
representative

(being one or more persons having

responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax)
makes an application in writing either to the Board of
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be
redeemed.
6.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 6

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
7.

Options and Tranfers after Death of Webb.
7.1

Upon the death of Webb, at the election of Webb's

personal representative, the Corporation shall be required to
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb at such time, as
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied:
(a)

This Agreement continues in effect and has

not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15.
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(b)

Within a reasonable time after the death of

Webb, but within nine (9) months an authorized
representative of Webb (being one or more persons having
responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax)
makes an application in writing either to the Board of
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be
redeemed,
7.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 7

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
8.

Options and Transfers After August 1, 1981.
8.1

At any time after August 1, 1981 the Corporation

shall have the option to purchase such amount of stock owned by
Webb that would reduce his ownership of the outstanding stock of
the Corporation to 20 percent, or such additional stock as is
necessary to cause the redemption to qualify as a sale or
exchange under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, but
not less than such amount.

Such*option shall be exercisable by

giving Webb written notice of such exercise.

Provided, however,

the Corporation may only exercise such option if such redemption
qualifies as a sale or exchange under Section 302(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
8.2

All redemptions of stock under this paragraph 8

shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
9.

Options and Transfers After August 1, 1986 and

Thereafter.
9.1

On August 1, 1986, and on August 1 in each

succeeding year at the election of Webb, the Corporation shall
be required to purchase as much as 20 percent of the Stock,
owned by Webb on August 1, 1986, or such additional Stock as may
be necessary to qualify such redemption as a sale or exchange
under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied:
-8-
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(a)

This Agreement continues in effect and has

not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15,
(b)

Within five months after such date, Webb

makes an application in writing either to the Board of
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be
redeemed.
9.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 9

shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
10.

Options Upon Death of Webb.
10.1

Upon the death of Webb the Corporation shall

have the option to purchase all .but not less than all the Stock
owned by Webb at such time of his death.

Such option shall be

exercisable by giving his personal representative written notice
of such exercise at any time within six (6) months after the
date of his death.

If the Corporation does not so exercise its

option, the Corporation shall, not later than five (5) days
after the expiration of said six (6) month period, advise each
Stockholder that such option was not so exercised by the
Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of the
Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall not
in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with respect
to such Stock.
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a
Primary Option, or seventy

(70) days, with respect to a

Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and,
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner
and proportions as, and subject to the same ter^ms and
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this
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Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii)
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price" shall in each
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which
the partiuclar option has been exercised.
10.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 10

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
11.

Options Upon August 1, 1986 and Thereafter.
11.1

At August 1, 1986 and on such date in each

succeeding year the Corporation shall have the option to
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb on such date,
provided the Corporation must purchase sufficient Stock to have
the redemption qualify as an exchange under section 302(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.

Such option

shall be exercisable by giving Webb written notice of such
exercise at any time within six (6) months after such date.

If

the Corporation does not so exercise its option, the Corporation
shall, not later than five (5) days after the expiration of said
six (6) month period, advise each Stockholder of the date on
which the Corporation that such option was not so exercised by
the Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of
the Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall
not in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with
respect to such Stock.
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a
Primary Option, or seventy (70) days, with respect to a
Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and,
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner
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and proportions as, and subject to the same terms and
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this
Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii)
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price" shall in each
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which
the partiuclar option has been exercised.
11.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 11

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
12•

Terms and Conditions of Purchase.
12.1

Purchase Price.

The purchase price of each

share of stock shall be the fair market value of the stock on
the date of purchase determined as follows:
The Stockholder who offers to sell his stock, or
the personal representatives of a decedent Stockholder,
shall appoint an appraiser to appraise the value of the
Stock.

If the other parties hereto do not agree to the

appraisal of such appraiser, such other parties shall
appoint a second appraiser to appraise the Stock,

The

average of the two appraisals so obtained shall be used in
determining the fair market value of the Stock, if the
higher of the two appraisals is no more than 105 percent of
the lower of the two appraisals; otherwise, the two
appraisers shall appoint a third appraiser, and any
appraisal agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall be
binding on the parties hereto absent fraud.

All appraisals

shall be based on the normal operations of the
Corporation.
appraisals.

The Corporation shall pay the costs of the
If the Stock is purchased under this Agreement

pursuant to options under paragraphs 10 or 11, and within
one year of such purchase Reagan sells his stock, the
purchase price and terms for the stock being purchased
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shall be adjusted so as to be equal to the price and terms
at which Reagan sold his stock,
12.2

Payment of Purchase Price.
(a)

In the event the stock being purchased is

being purchased upon the death of a Stockholder under
paragraph 6, the purchase price shall be paid in cash or
upon such other terms as may be agreed to by the parties,
(b)

In the event the stock is being purchased

pursuant to the exercise of the option under paragraph 8,
the purchase price shall be paid with a demand promissory
note which shall bear interest at the rate provided in
paragraph

(c) (ii) below.
(c)

In the event the stock is being purchased

pursuant to the exercise of options under paragraphs 9 or
11, the purchase price shall be paid
(i)
(ii)

In cash;
In 120 equal monthly payments together

with accrued interest with the first such payment due
one month from the date the option is exercised.

The

interest rate shall be determined annually for
payments due for one year following the date of
adjustment and shall be equal to two percentage points
over the average rate for United States Treasury Bonds
with a 10-year maturity date for the period 15 days
before and 15 days after the date the option was
exercised, or for subsequent years, the anniversary
date of such exercise.
without penalty.

All amounts due may be prepaid

Provided, however, if payments are

due under this paragraph and Reagan sells his stock in
a transaction that is not a reorganization under
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, the payments due under this paragraph shall
thereafter, at the option of Webb, be on the same
payment due and terms of such sale; or
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(iii)

Upon such other terms as may be agreed

to by the parties.
(d)

In the event the stock is being purchased

pursuant, to the exercise of options under paragraphs 7 or 10,
the purchase price shall be paid
(i)
(ii)

In cash;
A down payment equal to the federal estate

tax imposed on the value of the stock included in Webb's
estate for federal estate tax purposes based on the average
tax rate imposed on such estate.

The balance shall be paid

as provided in paragraph (c)(ii) above; or
(iii)

Upon such other terms as may be agreed to by

the parties.
13.

Legend on Certificates.

All Stock whether now owned

or hereafter acquired by any party to this Agreement shall be
subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and all certificates
representing the Stock shall bear the following legend:
The shares represented by this Certificate are subject to and
transferable only on compliance with an Agreement dated
between the Corporation and its
shareholders, a copy of which is on file at the offices of the
Corporation.
14.

Voting Agreement.
14.1

Voting Agreement Until August 1, 1986.

The

Stockholders hereby agree to vote their Stock at all meetings of
the Stockholders until August 1, 1986, the death of Roland Webb
or Reagan, or the termination of this Agreement under paragraph
15 whichever is sooner, as follows:
(a)

To elect Reagan, Norm Clark, or such other

person that is designated by Reagan, Webb, Duanne C.
Karren, or such other person that is designated by Webb,
and Gerald Gray, or such other person that is mutually
agreed upon by Reagan and Webb as members of the Board of
Directors.

All transactions between the Corporation and a

Shareholder, except as provided in (b) (c\

and (d) below,

shall be subject to approval by such Board of Directors.
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(b)

To have the Corporation enter into

employment agreements with Reagan and Webb upon the terms
set out in the agreements attached hereto as Exhibits A and
B.
(c)

To have the Corporation sell real property,

more particularly described on Exhibit C attached hereto,
to Webb Investment for $548,310.
(d)

To have the Corporation lease real property,

more particularly described on Exhibit D attached hereto,
under a lease substantially the same as Exhibit E, attached
hereto,
14.2

Voting Agreement After August 1, 1986.

The

Stockholders hereby agree to vote their stock at all meetings of
the Stockholders after August 1, 1986 to elect Roland Webb as a
director so long as he owns Stock or until the death of Roland
Webb or Reagan or the termination of this Agreement.
15.

Termination.

This Agreement and all rights and

duties provided for hereunder shall terminate upon the occurrence of
any of the following events:
(a)

The bankruptcy or dissolution of the Corporation;

(b)

A single Stockholder becoming the owner of all

Stock of the Corporation which is then subject to this Agreement;
(c)

Execution of a written instrument by the holders

of all of the Stock outstanding which terminates this Agreement.
The termination of this Agreement for any reason shall not
affect any right or remedy existing hereunder prior to the effective
date of such termination.
16.

Rights of Ownership.

The Stockholders shall retain

all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation, except those
specifically modified by this Agreement.
17.

Subchapter S Election.
17.1

It is the desire and intention of the

Corporation and each of the Stockholders that the Corporation
should make a Subchapter S election under the United States
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Internal Revenue Code 1954, as amended, and should terminate and
revoke any such election once made only in accordance with the
determination of the holders of a majority of all the
outstanding stock of the Corporation.
17.2

In order to protect any Subchapter S election

made by the Corporation and to prevent its inadvertent
termination by transfer of any stock of the Corporation into the
hands of more than fifteen shareholders or an unqualified or
nonconsenting shareholder, the Stockholders, intending to
legally bind themselves, their successors, executors,
administrators, heirs and assigns, hereby agree as follows; and
agree that they will vote their shares, execute necessary
documents, take other required action, and otherwise exert their
best efforts at all times in good faith to accomplish the
following objectives:
(a)

If the holders of a majority of all

outstanding stock of- the Corporation at any time determine
that it will be in the best interest of the Corporation and
its shareholders to make an election, or to terminate or
revoke an election, under Subchapter S of the United States
Internal Revenue Code, (i) the Corporation agrees that it
will make such election by timely filing of Form 2553 or
other appropriate form and supporting documents, and to
terminate or revoke such election and (ii) the Stockholders
agree that each will give his written consent thereto in
such form and manner and execute all documents and take
such other action as may be necessary or adviseable to
effectuate such determination.

If any document evidencing

such consent or other action is required for filing or
other purposes under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code or otherwise in order to effectuate such
determination, and any shareholder is unable or otherwise
fails to execute such document or take such other action in
due and timely manner, then Stockholder hereby appoints the
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Secretary of the Corporation to be his attorney-in-fact to
execute such document and to take all other action in his
place and stead which may be necessary or advisable to
effectuate such determination,
(b)

No Stockholder will sellr assign or transfer

any of his shares of the Corporation to any person or in
any manner which would cause a Subchapter S election
theretofore made by the Corporation to be terminated or
revoked, without the prior consent by vote or in writing of
the holders of a majority in interest of all the
outstanding stock of the Corporation.
18.

Notices.

All notices provided for by this Agreement

shall be made in writing either by actual delivery of the notice
into the hands of the party entitled thereto or by mailing the
notice in the United States mails to the last known address as shown
on the records of the Corporation, of the party entitled thereto,
certified mail, return receipt requested.

In either case, such

notice shall be deemed to be given and received upon its actual
receipt by the party entitled thereto.
19.

Closing Date.

The Closing Date shall be August 1,

20.

Condition Precedent.

1981.
The obligations of all the

parties to this Agreement are subject to the Closing of the purchase
by the Corporation of at least eighty percent of the outstanding
stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
21.

Genearl Provisions.
21.1

Remedies for Breach.

The Stock is a unique

chattel and each party to this Agreement shall have the remedies
which are available to him, her or it for the violation of any
of the terms of this Agreement, including, but not limited to,
the equitable remedy of specific performance.
21.2

Descriptive Headings.

Titles to paragraphs are

for information purposes only.
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21.3

Successors, etc.

Except as hereinabove

expressly provided otherwise, this Agreement shall bind and
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
heirs, distributees, executors, administrators, successors
(including, without limitations, guardians, conservators, or
trustees in bankruptcy) and assigns; but nothing herein shall be
construed as an authorization of any party to assign or delegate
his rights or obligations hereunder.

Each Stockholder by the

signing hereof directs his or her personal representative to
open their estates promptly in the courts of proper jurisdiction
and to execute, procure and deliver all documents, including,
but not limited to, appropriate orders of court, and estate and
inheritance tax waivers, as may be required to effectuate the
purposes of this Agreement.
21.4

Invalid Provision,

The invalidity or

unenforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement
shall not affect the other provisions hereof, and the Agreement
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid or
unenforceable provisions were 'omitted.
21.5

Governing Law,

This Agreement shall be

construed pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah then in
effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement as of the day and year first above written.

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC
Attest:

^
Secretary
William K. ReaganN^ //

* Roland Webb

Bessie P. Webb
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